Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko (R) enter the hall to meet the media after their talks in Sochi, Russia, April 4, 2005.

To make matters worse, Putin's attempt to achieve a propaganda coup in May, when leaders of the World War II allied powers will gather in Moscow to celebrate the Nazis' defeat 60 years ago, may result in embarrassment. In discussions of World War II, Russian authorities have distorted history. Claims that the Baltic countries voluntarily joined the Soviet Union and were not forced into it by Josef Stalin are applauded by those in Russia who harbor great power ambitions, but are ridiculed everywhere else. Such Orwellian distortions, accompanied by the intemperate charges of neo-fascism that have been leveled at the presidents of Estonia and Lithuania for not participating in the May 9 events, have proven to be a blunder. Among other things, they have prompted U.S. President George W. Bush's advisers to urge him to meet with all three Baltic presidents in Latvia before traveling to Moscow -- a side trip that some Russian commentators call a hostile move.

Moreover, the Kremlin's historical myopia has fueled fears among Russia's neighbors about Moscow's neo-imperial ambitions. It has also reinforced doubts on both sides of the Atlantic about the wisdom of engaging a man who has returned to autocracy. Such self-isolation on Putin's part may culminate in his being afflicted with the "Arafat syndrome," that is, the conviction in the West that no fruitful relations can be conducted with Russia as long as he remains in charge.

That crossroads has not been reached yet, and Putin can dramatically improve his badly tarnished image by confronting the Western leaders next month in Moscow with a bold initiative -- helping arrange a settlement to the Belarus question. The dictatorship of Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko has the potential of tangling Putin in a no-win situation. It could provoke a crisis with the West if the authorities in Minsk, facing mass demonstrations, resort to brutal repression.

Putin should begin negotiations with his Western counterparts to arrange Lukashenko's peaceful removal from office -- and should not join Lukashenko in a new union, as has been discussed by the Russian media since their meeting in Sochi. The talks should ultimately establish a process that guarantees future open and democratic elections in Belarus.

Of course, Russian and Western analysts alike will dismiss this proposal as being naive and implausible in the extreme for at least two reasons.

First, unlike the shaky authoritarian, pro-Russian governments that were removed from power in Georgia and Ukraine, Lukashenko is well-entrenched in Belarus. In addition to enjoying widespread popular appeal in rural areas and among those still employed in Soviet-style, state-owned enterprises, Lukashenko has the police and military on his side. The opposition is weak, and while some brave souls have openly protested his dictatorial rule, their numbers are smaller than in Georgia or Ukraine. Besides, many of them have been imprisoned, expelled from the country or brutally intimidated.

In light of Lukashenko's past behavior, most observers believe with good reason that he would respond with force were he confronted with a mass uprising similar to those that took place in Ukraine in December and recently in Kyrgyzstan.

Second, while relations between Lukashenko and Putin have fluctuated between modest cooperation and outright friction, the Russian leadership sees no reason to remove him from power. On the contrary, Lukashenko is Russia's closest -- and perhaps last -- ally in the former Soviet space. And Putin is prepared, precisely because of setbacks suffered elsewhere in the CIS, to consummate a union with Belarus. But to embrace a man who has been isolated from the international community would be a grave error and contrary to Russia's national interest.

Furthermore, Putin must scrap the idea that he can resurrect Russia as a dominant force in world affairs without first achieving stability and prosperity at home. Wracked by demographic, economic, political and social problems, Russia cannot achieve this objective without the assistance and cooperation of Western democracies. Among other things, they are the only ones capable of helping Russia exploit the vast riches of Siberia. Putin's failure to do so may result in China's de facto control of that region by mid-point in this century.

Lukashenko can survive for several more years, but his days are numbered. With the Kremlin's support, he may survive longer, but by embracing him, Putin would not win friends in Belarus or in the West. On the contrary, Putin would isolate himself even further, should Lukashenko crush a popular uprising in Belarus. Such an unfortunate event would foster anti-Russian feelings throughout the former Soviet Union. Most people who live in the region, including those in the Baltic countries, desire harmonious relations with Russia, but Putin's fantasies about creating a new imperial Russian state -- not to mention his use of energy assets to threaten their sovereignty -- have provided them with ample reason not to trust him.

At the same time, there is no question that the political elite in Minsk and those in the power ministries have been shaken by events in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. They have the power to crush a popular uprising in Belarus, but one of the lessons learned from Ukraine is that in the crucible of revolutionary upheaval, even security forces and the military may change sides and support the people. It is plausible that many among the Belarussian political classes are looking for a way to break with Lukashenko if provided an alternative that will not punish them for their past infractions.

Putin and the Western leaders through joint action could provide them with this option while agreeing to the following conditions. First, Lukashenko would leave office with guarantees that he would avoid prosecution for his past actions. He would do so largely because Russia had joined the West in urging him to leave his post peacefully. In face of such an alliance, he would have no other option but bow to facts on the ground. Second, restrictions on an independent free press and open political activity on the part of opposition parties would be lifted. Finally, EU monitors would establish a process to ensure that parliamentary elections would be conducted before the end of 2005.

Hard-liners in Moscow would oppose this proposal, but Putin has the power to embark on this bold initiative. Although it is not risk-free, it is in Russia's vital interest to achieve a close relationship with the West -- a precondition for creating a stable and prosperous country, which is Russia's No. 1 security priority.

If Putin and his colleagues in the West have the courage and wisdom to take this bold step, further decline in Russian-Western relations might be avoided. Putin, of course, must reaffirm his commitment to democracy at home. But by resolving the Belarus question, he will create the conditions for a new beginning with the Americans and the Europeans while encouraging new Western investment in Russia. Indeed, if an agreement of this kind was arranged, it could produce a positive outcome for Putin on May 9 -- something that appears problematic under present circumstances.

Richard J. Krickus writes a column on world affairs for the Lithuanian national daily Lietuvos Rytas. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.